With the surge in globalization of many markets, few would question why projects are increasingly recognized as the key link between an organization’s strategic goals and the tactical work performed by its discrete functions (Harvard Business School, 1996). Across the corporate C-suite rank-and-file (CEO,
Military leaders are faced with large re-set costs and increasing inventories of equipment near end-of-life or that is too expensive to maintain and questionable for use in increasingly expeditionary engagements. The focus on land warfare over the past decade in IRAQ and Afghanistan is expected to shift to naval, air, and space domains – even against the backdrop of the changes in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Tunisia in 2011. During one of his last speeches as Defense Secretary, Robert Gates in addressing the cadets at the U.S. Military Academy stated, “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it” (Burns, 2011).
Having set the stage of the crisis over managing threats, is it possible to just ignore them or is there a lower opportunity cost in changing management practices? This paper will visit the fundamental value proposition in project management – methodology and its reign over “best practices.”
Questions that will be explored include:
- Why must an organization capture best practices?
- What are the determining factors in baselining a best practice?
- Can an organization have too many best practices?
- What are the impacts of establishing too many best practices that are mandated by senior management for use on all projects?
Well established by the past and modern pioneers in the science of project management, the process design to establish methodologies to control work have undergone a rigorous scientific evaluation to determine both frameworks and “best practices” within these frameworks. It was actually large-scale government projects that were the impetus for making important decisions that became the basis for project management methodology during the time when massive labor forces required organization and coordination to build the transcontinental railroad. Following the scientifically conducted work of Frederick Taylor on work flow dependency in steel mills and Henry Gantt for his schedule chart developed in Navy ship yards in WWI; again in WWII, complex government and military projects and a shrinking war-time labor supply demanded new organizational structures which brought about application methodologies including complex network diagrams (PERT Charts) and the Critical Path Method (Microsoft, 2011).
As transportation is the key element of military force projection, it has been paralleled by methodology application in the automotive industry. While the extent to which the body of work produced up till the end of the 20th century by notable scholars including Deming, Taguchi, Ishikawa, and others will remain the optimal framework is not yet clear. Historical extrapolation would suggest changes are imminent. It is unlikely this time that Deming and his TQM methodology can bring us “Out of the Crisis.”
The modern construct of work definition, planning, and control is entering an era where the majority of the processes will be orthogonal abstractions derived without management by human consciousness. This is the subject of meta-based rule sets that are adaptively compiled and sorted, used to produce parts, devices, and machines in “lights-out” factories while the originators of the meta-parameters might never know what their piece of open-source code is being used for or what methodology was used to apply it. Such is the present research being conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Project’s Agency (DAPRA) Tactical Technology Office (TTO) under the leadership of Dr. Paul Eremenko. He states, “DARPA’s goal is to replicate the success of the integrated circuit industry in coping with rapidly growing product complexity by moving to higher levels of abstraction in design, introducing design automation and model-based verification and decoupling the design and build phases of the development process” (Darpa, 2010). This is a stark contrast from the mostly rational, consensus driven, and systems engineering approaches that have dominated design, manufacturing, and test leading into the 21st century. The quest to reduce cost and time to achieve the ever increasing set of requirements for further performance and utilization, however measured, is out-pacing the organizational capability and political will of people to continue implementing the “best practices” known today.
With this contrast in mind, the debate concerning best practices and their having limited application is both relevant and ultimately existential in importance. A methodology is a system of constraints, a consistent architecture that provides an organizational structure for tools, techniques, and processes to achieve a desired result (Harvard, 2002). However, what if we can’t truly define the requirements, or to be more precise, the set of requirements that are achievable within the laws of physics? We have reached this point, where at best, the only consensus possible is an agreement that what we have no longer meets our requirements and in order to provide a system or platform that is better requires a requirements set that lacks consensus, is too expensive, and might not be achieved in any length of time. Developing capture plans in this type of industry environment is analogous to a soap-opera or horror novel. While the context of the challenge provided a ripe opportunity to justify a more competent lead systems integrator (LSI ) to assist the government in managing the acquisition of large and complex “systems-of-systems” programs like the Army’s now defunct and cancelled Future Combat Systems (FCS ), it also led to the reason it was cancelled. Unable to identify sufficiently mature technologies and money in the original project scope to deliver the expected set of requirements, the LSI adopted the pathological “rational actor paradigm” agenda to segment the program up into spin-out milestones to anchor measurements for congressional appropriation’s hawks who needed to show there was a return on investment (ROI) for the billions being spent. Ironically, the underlying CTD technology programs that were necessary to complete technology maturation, and where a majority of the subject matter experts (SMEs) resided, were the very same elements of the overall program that were cut to cover the rubber-banding production cost and schedule gaps.
With this contrast in mind, the debate concerning best practices and their having limited application is both relevant and ultimately existential in importance. A methodology is a system of constraints, a consistent architecture that provides an organizational structure for tools, techniques, and processes to achieve a desired result (Harvard, 2002). However, what if we can’t truly define the requirements, or to be more precise, the set of requirements that are achievable within the laws of physics? We have reached this point, where at best, the only consensus possible is an agreement that what we have no longer meets our requirements and in order to provide a system or platform that is better requires a requirements set that lacks consensus, is too expensive, and might not be achieved in any length of time. Developing capture plans in this type of industry environment is analogous to a soap-opera or horror novel. While the context of the challenge provided a ripe opportunity to justify a more competent lead systems integrator (
It should be clear that what resulted was a program caught in marginal design iterations without any ability to measure performance gaps until it was late in the program and prototypes were delivered with capabilities that in some instances were impressive; however, their robustness, reliability, and life-cycle costs were astronomical. The chain of failed acquisition program for the Army since the early 1990s now totals over $18 billion and all the while, oversight organization including the Government Accountability Office (GAO) repeatedly cited numerous program risks and the apparent incentive for organizations to capitalize on the fear of failure by padding the rate structures to the point where it became clear to even non-accountants that organizational conflict of interest (OCI) problems were widespread and systemic throughout the program (Goure, 2010). This anecdote highlights the impact of not having an appropriately defined methodology and corresponding set of baseline best practices that provide acceptable enough returns to be sustainable.
Figure 1 - The fastest and simplest way to develop an Ishikawa or “fishbone” 4M diagram is for the group to choose the top five causes on the diagram and rank them, using their collective knowledge and any data available. The selection of the major causes may be done by voting or any other process that allows the group to agree on the ranking. The selected causes are then encircled on the diagram, with their ranks written beside them. The team may then investigate these causes further and use problem-solving techniques to eliminate their occurrences. Reference: http://www.siliconfareast.com/ishikawa.htm
In mid-2009, the Government changed course “180-degrees,” cancelled the Army’s Future Combat System’s main Manned Ground Vehicle (MGV) program and the U.S. Coast Guard’s Deepwater LSI -type programs among many others. Three months later, the industry gutting 2009 Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) was issued. It had internally defined goals to shift 14% of private industry defense R&D, integration, and requirement’s management back to government organizations. This shift was based on assumptions that departing subject matter experts would join the government work-force after being laid-off, fired, or otherwise quitting former defense jobs due to extreme austerity conditions. This to date has not happened and less than half this increase is expected with further budget cuts and revised rules on in-sourcing practices. And yet again, the GAO pointed out in a report that there was a lack of monitoring and controls in place to measure the effectiveness of WSARA and that the resulting impact to the defense industrial base could take decades from which to recover. Industry analysts at the Lexington Institute and other organizations have been highlighting that the Army has yet to adopt a methodology that will work with industry on how to appropriately baseline and manage procurements. In fact, with only 63 people in the relatively new Department of Defense (DOD) office for systems engineering and developmental test and evaluation covering a portfolio of over 250 defense acquisition programs, it is becoming increasingly clear that the risks of executing the portfolio within cost and schedule have increased (GAO, 2011).
The latest saga started with what is referred to as the “son-of-FCS ”, the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) program. After canceling the initial program for admitted requirement’s over-reach in August 2010, the initial development contracts, technology demonstration (TD) phase, are now fixed-price type contracts around $450 million and the initial set of deliverables is limited to a set of hull-structures for testing against mine-blast and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Analysts are quick to point how the Army has “un-learned” the lessons of FCS and will be entering the Engineering, Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase without having a clear set of requirements and only five-years until the formal start of production. Only near the end of the EMD phase will a fully functional prototype be expected and too-late to correct manufacturing costs that will be built-in at that time from the “walking wounded” set of sole-source suppliers that have survived the WSARA and the down-cycle defense spending period. With the political expectation for GCV to cost no-more than $10.5 million per copy, analysts are predicting the cost-estimated put together by the Pentagon is short by nearly $8 million per copy.
So, it seems the Army is back to where it started when MGV was cancelled in 2009 -except we have given a two-year pause to our adversaries (competitors), lost nearly 50% of the industry’s subject matter experts, have no clear consensus on requirements, and have demonstrated to stakeholders (taxpayers) that little confidence is merited for any ROI. It appears unlikely that the Army can start producing GCVs in seven years and they will probably cost near $18.5 million, and for which cost the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) was cancelled in 2010.
It appears the best practices evident across many Department of Defense acquisition programs are:
- Unclear and lack of consensus on requirements.
- Unclear and changing roles/responsibilities.
- Unrealistic cost goals with a historic negative ROI.
- Unrealistic schedule for given issues (1-3) above.
- Lack of a control plan with effective marketing of controversies which has the result of decreasing political will to support development of any new platform that can secure the legacy policy of overmatch in combat - the benchmark standard of U.S. Combat Forces.
- Reduced opportunity cost for military and political gain of potential adversaries including the Chinese military,
Similarly, in commercial industries, excess “global” mandates from senior management and even customers for rigorous and non-adaptive best practices are also destructive. Consider the case of the auto-industry – especially prior to 2009. The capital structure “best practices” in the industry had debt-to-equity ratios approaching 20 or even higher. The mutually supported love affair ended up with the GM filing for the 2nd largest bankruptsy in U.S. history and a federal bailout without true reforms in the industry’s union trenches.
The stage appears well set for the next revolution in project management best practices and they may very well again come from the impetus faced by the military and auto-industry, both partners - orthogonal as they may appear to some, in attempting to reduce cost and meet requirements by decoupling or removing man as much as possible from the project methodology as possible. This will fundamentally change the definition of systems engineering and have it replaced with meta-driven adaptive make processes that achieve agile in near real-time without the heavy weight monitoring and control practices or even the TQM philosophy of Deming as once required to forge commitments from a work force. The work force will be distributed, unengaged, and naïve as to their purposes. With machines building machines, at some point, even the man-machine interface providing the forge for production will limit man’s organizational and technical role.
The question remains whether there is intrinsic safety in cars and machines used by man. With a truly intelligent highway system our driving days may be over. Will infantry be needed on the battlefield or can machines fight better alone? Without the direct cost of human life, will wars now be fought at the supply chain level? To a machine, sovereignty might be defined based on resources alone. Will man’s dread of machine based adaptive manufacturing and organizational ownership result in a second romantic revolt against rationalism or will economic stability and scarcity become baseless metrics as conflict, the foundation of fear, becomes absent from the human experience. Will adaptive make algorithms, generated by machines based on aggregations of meta-parameters and available foundry processes operate with essentially a “3M” Ishikawa cause and effect rationale where man has been removed? The point is …who would measure it, why, and how?
References:
Burns, R. (2011), Costly Iraq war may mark shift in U.S. approach. Associated Press: October 23, 2011 . Retrieved from: http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2011/10/ap-iraq-costly-war-may-mark-shift-in-approach-102411/
A quick history of Project Management. Microsoft Office Project Help Topics [online]. RetrievedOctober 30, 2011 from: http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/project-help/a-quick-history-of-project-management-HA001135342.aspx
A quick history of Project Management. Microsoft Office Project Help Topics [online]. Retrieved
Project Management Manual,
Goure, D. (2010), Pentagon Proposes Major Changes To Rules On Contractor Conflicts of Interest. Lexington Institute, Early Warning Blog:
Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Public Law 111-23, 111th Congress:
Weapons Acquisition Reform: Actions Needed to Address Systems Engineering and Developmental Testing Challenges.
Eremenko, P. (2010), DARPA Aims To Revolutionize Defense Manufacturing. DAPRA Press Release: September 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.rfglobalnet.com/article.mvc/DARPA-Aims-To-Revolutionize-Defense-0001
Project Management Institute, Inc. (2008), A Guide to the Project Management Block of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide - Fourth Edition).
